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Abstract
I present a game-theoretical model to estimate consumption demand, accounting for
intra-household interaction among household members. Although multiple Nash equilib-
ria of consumption decisions may exist in a household, model parameters are pointwise
identiﬁed from household-level data for households with only two members. I propose
a semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator and apply it to empirically analyze the
subscription decision for cellular phone service in Taiwan. On average, a consumer’s
probability of subscribing to cellular service rises 35 percentage points when the other
household member chooses to subscribe. This result suggests the existence of intra-
household network eﬀects on cellular phone consumption. The intra-household eﬀect
increases in household income, but decreases in the number of kids and the age diﬀerence
in a household.
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11 Introduction
Standard microeconomic theory analyzes consumer behavior based on individual preferences.
When more than one person lives in a household, we need to take into account the intra-
household allocation of resources and consumption externalities among household members.
Consequently, a consumer’s decision depends on other household member’s choices. In this
paper, I use the term intra-household eﬀect to refer to the eﬀect on a consumer’s willingness
to pay caused by the decision of other members in the same household. I propose a game-
theoretical framework to estimate the intra-household eﬀect on the consumption of telephone
service.
There is a rich literature on estimating household demand for telecommunication ser-
vice. Generally, these studies use household-level survey data. Nonetheless, each household
is treated as a single decision-maker in the estimation. Only household heads’ individual
characteristics are included in the demand estimation. This approach implicitly assumes the
demand to be solely determined by household heads. Other members can inﬂuence the deci-
sion only indirectly through household-level variables.1 This assumption is unlikely to be true
in reality. Besides, most of these empirical studies on telephone demand focus on landline
phone service. There are relatively few works on the demand for cellular phone service. Iyen-
gar (2004) and Grzybowski and Pereira (2007) estimate the cellular phone service demand
by using data from billing records. No demographic characteristic is observed in Iyengar
(2004)’s data while only very few demographic characteristics are available in Grzybowski
and Pereira (2007)’s work. In contrast, I use a household survey which provides information
on many household demographic variables.2
1Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987) and Train, Ben-Akiva, and Atherton (1989) only consider ag-
gregate household income. In the estimation of demand for local telephone service under optional rate plans,
Miravete (2002) includes several household-level characteristics. His empirical analysis only accounts for
household head’s individual characteristics, but not other members’ characteristics. Many previous researches
(Rappoport and Taylor, 1997; Solvason, 1997; Madden and Simpson, 1997; Duﬀy-Deno, 2001; Rodini, Ward,
and Woroch, 2003; Economides, Seim, and Viard, 2006) use similar approach in estimating telephone demand.
2A diﬀerent approach, proposed by Bajari, Fox, and Ryan (2007), estimates demand for cellular phone
service by using market share ranks. Their focus is the value of national coverage. Individual demographic
variables are not included in their estimation as well.
2As Browning, Bourguignon, Chaippori, and Lechene (1994) point out, household behavior
depends on intra-household interactions unless we impose some restrictive hypotheses such
as transferable utilities. They propose a collective household model: Household members
bargain with each other to allocate their overall resources. Individual consumption depends
on the allocation. The bargaining power depends on individual characteristics. The resource
allocation must achieve Pareto eﬃcient in the bargaining process. Using data on couples
with no kids, they ﬁnd that the allocation of expenditure depends on the relative incomes
and relative ages of the couples, rejecting the hypotheses of a single decision-maker in a
household. See Vermeulen (2002) for further discussions on the collective household model.
I consider a model of binary subscription choices. When there is only a single person in
a household, this model reduces to a standard discrete choice model. When more than one
person lives in a household, consumption externalities among the members may aﬀect their
demand. For example, if the husband has a cellular phone, the wife may have a stronger desire
to own a cellular phone as well. There are several possible reasons for positive intra-household
eﬀect. The ﬁrst one is the direct network eﬀect. Because the husband can be contacted by
phone more frequently, the wife’s demand for cellular phone service increases. The second
reason is the indirect network eﬀect. For instance, since the husband’s knowledge of cellular
phone service from his own consumption reduces the wife’s search cost on her subscription
decision, she is likely to have higher demand. A third explanation is the price eﬀect. When
the price of a cellular-to-cellular phone call is lower than that of a landline-to-cellular phone
call3, the wife can pays less for a call from a cellular phone than one from a landline phone.
Consequently, she may have higher demand for cellular phone service. Similarly, if carriers
oﬀer family plans which lowers the subscription fee for a second cellular phone, there exist
positive intra-household eﬀect on the consumption. On the other hand, intra-household eﬀect
may be negative if a cellular phone is a public good in a household. Then, each household
member wants to be a free-rider and shares the usage of the other person’s cellular phone.
Because intra-household eﬀect can be either positive or negative in theory, ﬁnding out its
3This is the case when cellular carriers oﬀers in-network discounts.
3sign for a particular good is an empirical issue. The objective of the paper is to estimate the
sign and the magnitude of intra-household eﬀects for cellular phone service.
In the current paper, I restrict my attention to households with only two members. Each
of the two members makes a binary choice on the subscription of telephone service. My model
is similar to entry models in the industrial organization literature, such as Bresnahan and
Reiss (1990). However, the spillover eﬀects between two ﬁrms in an entry model are always
negative. The entrance of one ﬁrm reduces the proﬁt of the other ﬁrm. Their entry decisions
must be strategic substitutes. For household consumption behavior, the eﬀects may be either
positive or negative. When they are positive, the decisions are strategic complements. I do
not restrict the sign of intra-household eﬀects in the estimation. In addition, the sign can
vary across households. I will investigate how intra-household eﬀects vary across households.
Diﬀerent from Browning et al. (1994)’s collective household model, the equilibrium allocation
is not necessarily Pareto optimal in my game-theoretical model.
The primary diﬃculty in the estimation is to deal with multiple Nash equilibria. When
intra-household eﬀect is negative, we can estimate the model by using the equilibrium num-
ber of subscribers in a household, which always has a unique equilibrium, as in Bresnahan
and Reiss (1990)’s entry model. On the contrary, when intra-household eﬀect is positive, this
approach does not work because the equilibrium number of subscribers may have multiple
Nash equilibria as well. Because there is no one-to-one mapping between model primitives
and outcomes in the presence of multiple equilibria, model parameters can only be partially
identiﬁed in general. To explicitly deal with multiple Nash equilibria, one approach is to
consider the selection rule among these equilibria. For example, Jia (2007) imposes an ad
hoc selection rule to choose among multiple market equilibria. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan
(2007) propose a simulation-based method to estimate the selection rule. Another approach
uses bounds estimation based on inequality constraints derived from necessary conditions for
pure strategy Nash equilibria (Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer, 2007; Ciliberto and Tamer,
2007; Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii, 2006). Nonetheless, for a two-by-two game, Tamer (2003)
shows that point identiﬁcation can be achieved under a suitable exclusion condition. He
4proposes a two-step estimation procedure. In the ﬁrst step, use nonparametric estimation
to determine the selection among multiple equilibria. Model parameters are obtained by a
maximum likelihood estimation in the second step. In Tamer’s paper, however, the interac-
tion eﬀect between the two agents is assumed to be constant, independent of any observed
characteristic. In this paper, I generalize Tamer’s model and allow the interaction eﬀect to be
heterogeneous, depending on observed household characteristics. I show that the parameters
in this generalized demand model can still be pointwise identiﬁed.
I apply the econometric approach to study the demand for cellular phone service in
Taiwan. The estimated marginal intra-household eﬀect of cellular phone service increases a
consumer’s probability of subscription by 35.24 percentage points on average. The ﬁnding
suggests the existence of network eﬀect within a household. Heterogeneity of the eﬀects
across households can be explained by the observed characteristics. Intra-household eﬀects
increase in household income, but decrease in the number of kids and the age diﬀerence in a
household.
Another important contribution of this paper is to estimate the direct eﬀect of both
household-level and individual-level characteristics on telephone demand after controlling for
intra-household eﬀects. Previous researches only include household head’s individual char-
acteristics, but not other member’s individual characteristics, in the estimation. Therefore,
it is diﬃcult to identify the eﬀect of some individual demographic variables such as gender
since most household heads are male. In this paper, I ﬁnd that males have higher demand
for cellular phone service than females. Moreover, household income by itself has a negative
eﬀect on telephone consumption, but individual income has a positive eﬀect. Because the
latter eﬀect is substantially larger than the former one, the total eﬀect for an increase in a
consumer’s income is positive.
In the next section, I introduce the econometric model and propose my estimation ap-
proach. Section 3 describes the data to be used in the estimation. I then present my empirical
results on the consumption of cellular phone service in Taiwan and demonstrate the estimated
intra-household eﬀects in Section 4. Concludes are given in the ﬁnal section.
52 Econometric Model
The presence of intra-household eﬀect means that consumption depends on the decision of
other household members. In this section, I present a static discrete choice model which is an
extension of the probit model. I restrict my attention to households with two members and
show that the model parameters are fully identiﬁed despite the existence of multiple Nash
equilibria in a noncooperative game between the two household members. I then present
a semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator and conduct a Monte Carlo experiment to
demonstrate the performance of the estimator.
2.1 Discrete Choice Model
For household i, there are two members j ∈ {1,2}. All characteristics of each member are
observed by both members. Household-level characteristics, such as household income, resi-
dence location, ..., etc., are common to both member, while individual-level characteristics,
such as gender, age, education ...etc., are not. Furthermore, some characteristics, such as
taste on new technology, are observed only by the two household members, but not by the
econometrician.
A consumer’s subscription decision depends on the direct eﬀect of consumption and the
intra-household eﬀect of consumption. The former eﬀect is determined by the consumer’s own
individual-level characteristics as well as the household-level characteristics in his household.
The latter eﬀect depends on the choice of the other household member. Its magnitude is
normalized to zero when the other member does not subscribe. I assume the intra-household
eﬀect is reciprocal between the two members and its magnitude is determined by household-
level characteristics.
Let the binary variable yij ∈ {0,1} denote the subscription decision of individual j in
household i. Let yij = 1 if and only if the individual subscribes to the telephone service. The
6demand is characterized by
yij = 1 ⇔ [x′
ijβ + εij] + yi(3−j)[z′
iγ] > 0, (1)
where (3 − j) is the index for the other member in the household. The terms in the ﬁrst
bracket of equation (1) represents the direct eﬀect of consumption. The term in the second
bracket, z′
iγ, captures the magnitude of the intra-household eﬀect. The vector xij is member
j’s observed characteristics (including both household-level and individual-level characteris-
tics) and the scalar εij represents his unobserved characteristics. The vector zi includes all
household-level characteristics which aﬀect the intra-household eﬀect. To identify the model
parameters, at least one of the elements in the vector xij (such as member j’s age) is not a
household-level characteristic. Furthermore, both xij and zi contain a constant term. My
model reduces to the standard probit model if the intra-household eﬀect vanishes (γ = 0). If
the intra-household eﬀect is restricted to be constant across households, as in Tamer (2003)’s
model, the vector zi only contains the constant term (z′
iγ = γ0).
The unobserved characteristics (εi1,εi2) are assumed to be jointly normally distributed,
independently across households.
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The variance of εij is normalized to one. The correlation coeﬃcient ρ in (2) is to be estimated.
Finally, let Yi = yi1 + yi2 denote the total number of subscribers in the household.
2.2 Nash Equilibria
Consider a simultaneous-move non-cooperative game.4 This is similar to the incomplete
model discussed in Tamer (2003). Figure 1 shows the set of equilibria for positive intra-
4The set of Nash equilibria under a cooperative game is a subset of Nash equilibria under a non-cooperative
game. Consequently, the results under a cooperative game can be viewed as imposing an equilibrium selection
rule on the results under a non-cooperative game. I will discuss more on this issue in Subsection 2.4.
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Figure 1: Nash equilibria for positive intra-household eﬀects
8household eﬀect (z′
iγ > 0) conditional on observed characteristics (xi1,xi2,zi) and unob-
served characteristics (εi1,εi2). There are multiple Nash equilibria when (εi1,εi2) ∈ (−x′
i1β−
z′
iγ,−x′
i1β)×(−x′
i2β−z′
iγ,−x′
i2β). Both (yi1,yi2) = (0,0) and (yi1,yi2) = (1,1) are equilib-
ria in this region. Nonetheless, the model predicts the exact probability for (yi1,yi2) = (0,1)
and (yi1,yi2) = (1,0). Given the observed characteristics (xi1,xi2,zi), the probability of the
event (yi1,yi2) = (0,0) is bounded by
Pr
 
{εi1 < −x′
i1β − z′
iγ, εi2 < −x′
i2β} ∪ {εi1 < −x′
i1β, εi2 < −x′
i2β − z′
iγ}|xi1,xi2,zi
 
and
Pr(εi1 < −x′
i1β, εi2 < −x′
i2β|xi1,xi2,zi).
On the other hand, when the eﬀect is negative (z′
iγ < 0), there are multiple equilibria of
(0,1) and (1,0) if (εi1,εi2) ∈ (−x′
i1β,−x′
i1β − z′
iγ) × (−x′
i2β,−x′
i2β − z′
iγ). (See Figure 2.)
The model gives the exact probabilities of (yi1,yi2) = (0,0) and (yi1,yi2) = (1,1), but not
(yi1,yi2) = (0,1) and (yi1,yi2) = (1,0).
Regardless the sign of intra-household eﬀect, the exact probability of observing one sub-
scriber in a household (Yi = yi1 + yi2 = 1) for given observed characteristics (xi1,xi2,zi) can
summarized as
P1 (xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ)
≡Pr(Yi = 1|xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ)
=Pr
 
εi1<−x′
i1β − z′
iγ,εi2>−x′
i2β|xi1,xi2,zi
 
+Pr
 
εi1>−x′
i1β,εi2<−x′
i2β − z′
iγ|xi1,xi2,zi
 
− 1{z′
iγ<0}Pr
 
−x′
i1β<εi1<−x′
i1β − z′
iγ,−x′
i2β<εi2<−x′
i2β − z′
iγ|xi1,xi2,zi
 
, (3)
where 1{ } denotes the indicator function. However, the exact probabilities of no subscriber
(Yi = 0) and two subscribers (Yi = 2) in a household are unknown when intra-household eﬀect
is positive because we do not know how individuals choose among multiple Nash equilibria.5
5Contrary to my model, in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990)’s entry model, the eﬀect must be negative. As a
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Figure 2: Nash equilibria for negative intra-household eﬀects
10Without loss of generality, we only need to focus on the probability Pr(Yi = 0|xi1,xi2,zi)
because Pr(Yi = 2|xi1,xi2,zi) can be obtained from 1 − Pr(Yi = 0|xi1,xi2,zi) − Pr(Yi =
1|xi1,xi2,zi). Without imposing any equilibrium selection rule, the probability of no sub-
scriber in a household is bounded in an interval. The upper bound occurs when individuals
always fail to coordinate their decisions in the event of multiple Nash equilibria.
PU
0 (xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ) ≡ Pr(εi1 <−x′
i1β, εi2 <−x′
i2β|xi1,xi2,zi). (4)
The lower bound is achieved when individuals can perfectly coordinate.
PL
0 (xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ) ≡ Pr(εi1 < −x′
i1β, εi2 < −x′
i2β|xi1,xi2,zi)
− 1{z′
iγ>0}Pr(−x′
i1β − z′
iγ<εi1<−x′
i1β,−x′
i2β − z′
iγ<εi2<−x′
i2β|xi1,xi2,zi). (5)
2.3 Identiﬁcation
Although multiple Nash equilibria are possible, the parameters in the econometric model
are pointwise identiﬁed. My model is similar to but more complicated than Tamer (2003).
Tamer’s model is identiﬁed when we have data on the individual decisions (yi1,yi2). However,
the data set that I use only reports the aggregate decision in a household (Yi = yi1 + yi2),
not individual choices. Nonetheless, the following theorem shows the parameters are still
identiﬁed.
Theorem 1. Suppose that there exists a regressor of individual characteristics (xi1k,xi2k)
with xi1k,xi2k / ∈ zi and βk  = 0 and such that the conditional distribution of xi1k|x−i1k has
an everywhere positive Lebesgue density where x−i1k = (xi11,...,xi1,k−1,xi1,k+1,...,xi1K)′.
Then the parameters, (β,γ,ρ), are identiﬁed if the matrices X1 ≡ [x11 x21    xN1], X2 ≡
[x12 x22    xN2], and Z ≡ [z1 z2    zN] have full rank.
Proof. In equation (3), I have shown that the exact probabilities of Yi = 1, which is denoted
by P1(xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ), can be obtained for any given observed characteristics (xi1,xi2,zi).
result, the value of Yi is unique in equilibrium.
11Without loss of generality, assume βk > 0. Let (  β,   γ,   ρ) be diﬀerent from (β,γ,ρ). I will
consider four possible cases.
Case 1:   β  = β and   βk > 0: As xi1k goes to minus inﬁnity for given x−i1k, both xi1kβk and
xi1k  βk go to minus inﬁnity. Because X2 has full rank, there exists x∗
i2 such that x∗′
i2β  = x∗′
i2  β.
Consequently, as xi1k → −∞,
P1 (xi1,x∗
i2,zi;β,γ,ρ) ≃ Pr
 
εi2 > −x∗′
i2β
 
 = Pr
 
εi2 > −x∗′
i2  β
 
≃ P1
 
xi1,x∗
i2,zi;   β,   γ,   ρ
 
.
This implies the parameters (β,γ,ρ) are identiﬁed.
Case 2:   β  = β and   βk < 0: Since Z has full rank, there exists z∗
i such that z∗′
i γ  = z∗′
i   γ
when   γ  = γ. If the parameters are not identiﬁed, then
P1 (xi1,xi2,z∗
i;β,γ,ρ) ≃ Pr(εi2 > −x′
i2β)
= Pr
 
εi2 < −x′
i2  β − z∗′
i   γ
 
≃ P1
 
xi1,xi2,z∗
i;   β,   γ,   ρ
 
. (6)
for any xi2 as xi1k → −∞ for given x−i1k, and
P1 (xi1,xi2,z∗
i;β,γ,ρ) ≃ Pr
 
εi2 < −x′
i2β − z∗′
i γ
 
= Pr
 
εi2 > −x′
i2  β
 
≃ P1
 
xi1,xi2,z∗
i;   β,   γ,   ρ
 
. (7)
for any xi2 as xi1k → +∞ for given x−i1k. Since εi2 is a symmetric distribution with zero
mean, Equations (6) and (7) together imply
x′
i2β = −x′
i2  β − z∗′
i   γ = x′
i2β + z∗′
i γ − z∗′
i   γ  = x′
i2β.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, equations (6) and (7) cannot hold together, implying the
parameters (β,γ,ρ) are identiﬁed when   γ  = γ.
If   γ = γ, either equation (6) or (7) implies that x′
i2(β +   β) + z∗′
i γ = 0 holds for any
12(xi2,zi). This contradicts with the fact that X2 and Z both have full rank.
Case 3:   β = β but   γ  = γ: Because βk > 0, I know   βk > 0. Let xi1k go to positive inﬁnity.
Both xi1kβk and xi1k  βk go to positive inﬁnity. Because Z has full rank, there exists z∗∗
i such
that z∗∗′
i γ  = z∗∗′
i   γ. As x−i1k → +∞, for any xi2, I have
P1 (xi1,xi2,z∗∗
i ;β,γ,ρ) ≃ Pr
 
εi2 < −x′
i2β − z∗∗′
i γ
 
 = Pr
 
εi2 < −x′
i2  β − z∗∗′
i   γ
 
≃ P1
 
xi1,xi2,z∗∗
i ;   β,   γ,ρ
 
.
Therefore, I can identify the parameters.
Case 4: (  β,   γ) = (β,γ) but   ρ  = ρ: For z′
iγ > 0, I have
∂P1(xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ)
∂ρ
= −
e
−
(x′
i1β+z′
iγ)2+(x′
i2β)2−2ρ(x′
i1β+z′
iγ)(x′
i2β)
2(1−ρ2)
π
 
1 − ρ2 < 0.
Similarly, for z′
iγ < 0, I can obtain
∂P1(xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ)
∂ρ
=
−
e
−
(x′
i1β)2+(x′
i2β)2−2ρ(x′
i1β)(x′
i2β)
2(1−ρ2)
2π
 
1 − ρ2 −
e
−
(x′
i1β+z′
iγ)2+(x′
i2β+z′
iγ)2−2ρ(x′
i1β+z′
iγ)(x′
i2β+z′
iγ)
2(1−ρ2)
2π
 
1 − ρ2 < 0.
Therefore, ρ can be identiﬁed from the data.
Note that identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcients (β,γ) only depends on the marginal distribution
of the idiosyncratic preferences (εi1,εi2), not on their joint distribution.
2.4 Semiparametric Maximum Likelihood Estimator
If intra-household eﬀect is negative, I know the exact probability of the events {Yi = 0},
{Yi = 1}, and {Yi = 2} conditional on the observed characteristics (xi1,xi2,zi). Consequently,
the usual likelihood can be computed. On the contrary, the exact probabilities of {Yi = 0}
and {Yi = 2} are unknown when the eﬀect is positive. I use a semiparametric maximum
13likelihood estimator, extended from Tamer (2003)’s approach, to obtain the parameters in
the demand model. Speciﬁcally, the estimation consists of two steps. In the ﬁrst step, I use a
kernel regression to obtain the empirical probability of {Yi = 0}. In the second step, I replace
the unknown probabilities in the likelihood function by the empirical probabilities obtained
in the ﬁrst step and maximize the likelihood to obtain the parameter estimates.
Deﬁne the conditional probability of the event {Yi = 0} for observed characteristics
(xi1,xi2,zi) as
H(xi1,xi2,zi) = Pr(Yi = 0|xi1,xi2,zi).
When the function H is known, I can write down the likelihood, and the parameters (β,γ,ρ)
are estimated by maximizing the logarithm of the likelihood function. For a random sample
with size N,6 the logarithm of the likelihood function is
L(β,γ,ρ;H) =
1
N
 
i
 
1[Yi = 0]log(H(xi1,xi2,zi))
+1[Yi = 1]log(P1 (xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ))
+1[Yi = 2]log
 
1 − H(xi1,xi2,zi) − P1 (xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ)
  
(8)
The unknown function H(xi1,xi2,zi) represents the probability of observing no subscriber
in a household. From equations (4) and (5), we know that H(xi1,xi2,zi) is bounded by the
closed interval [PL
0 (xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ),PU
0 (xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ)] when multiple Nash equilibria
exist, but the model cannot predict the exact probability. I follow Tamer (2003)’s sugges-
tion to approximate the unknown function by a kernel regression of the event {Yi = 0} on
the observed characteristics (xi1,xi2,zi).7 Since the function H(xi1,xi2,zi) is bounded by
[PL
0 (xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ),PU
0 (xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ)], I truncate the result of the kernel regression
6The survey data I use to perform estimation is not a random sample. Therefore, I need to adjust for the
sampling weights in my calculation. To ease the exposition, however, I present the estimator without writing
down the sampling weights.
7Any function which locally approximates the true probability of {Yi = 0} can be used in the estimation.
In the current paper, I use Gaussian kernel regression to estimate H(xi1,xi2,zi).
ˆ H(xi1,xi2,zi) =
1
N
P
i′ 1[Yi′ = 0]φ
￿
1
Bd[(xi1,xi2,zi),(xi′1,xi′2,zi)]
￿
1
N
P
i′ φ
￿
1
Bd[(xi1,xi2,zi),(xi′1,xi′2,zi)]
￿ ,
14by the upper and lower bounds and denote the value as ˆ H(xi1,xi2,zi;β,γ,ρ). Replace H
in the likelihood (8) by ˆ H. I can obtain a consistent estimate of (β,γ,ρ). To obtain the
variance of the estimator, I need to account for the standard errors resulting from the ker-
nel regression in the ﬁrst step. Instead of computing the analytic variance, I compute the
variance by bootstrapping.
Estimating the model under the assumption of a simultaneous-move non-cooperative game
seems restrictive, but it is actually not. When the interaction within a household is not a
simultaneous-move non-cooperative game, the proposed estimator is still consistent, though
it is less eﬃcient. If all households can perfectly coordinate their consumption decisions as
in a simultaneous-move cooperative game, the kernel estimator of H(xi1,xi2,zi) in the ﬁrst
step will converge to PL
0 (xi1,xi2,zi) in probability. My proposed estimator remains valid
for this situation. Similarly, if individuals make decisions sequentially rather than simulta-
neously, then the unique subgame-prefect equilibrium is also a subset of the Nash equilibria
under a simultaneous-move non-cooperative game. The kernel estimator of H(xi1,xi2,zi) will
also converge to the exact probability of no subscriber in the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Consequently, my estimation approach can also apply to this case.
2.5 Monte Carlo
To demonstrate the performance of my estimator, I conduct a Monte Carlo experiment using
the discrete choice model described in (1). For each individual, there are three observed
characteristics (xij1,xij2,zi). The ﬁrst two variables have direct eﬀect on the subscription
decision, while the ﬁnal one aﬀects the intra-household eﬀect. In addition, assume xi11 = xi21,
that is, this variable is common to both household members. The choice model of (1) can be
where φ is the density function of a standard normal distribution, and the metric d is deﬁned as
d[(xi1,xi2,zi),(xi′1,xi′2,zi′)] ≡
v
u
u
t 1
2K + L
"
2
X
j=1
K
X
k=1
(xijk − xi′jk)2
V ar(x jk)
+
L
X
l=1
(zil − zi′l)2
V ar(z l)
#
.
A bandwidth B = 0.3 is used for the following results. The parameter estimates are robust to changes in the
bandwidth B.
15Table 1: Monte Carlo Results
True Standard
Parameter Value Mean Median Deviation MSE
β0 -1.0 -1.006 -0.999 0.073 0.005
β1 2.5 2.605 2.580 0.207 0.054
β2 1.5 1.551 1.535 0.116 0.016
γ0 1.0 0.955 0.962 0.151 0.024
γ1 1.5 1.500 1.510 0.120 0.014
ρ -0.5 -0.535 -0.543 0.177 0.074
Notes: The Monte Carlo simulation is conducted for 100 samples.
Each sample consists of 1000 households.
expresses as
yij = 1 ⇔ [β0 + β1xij1 + β2xij2 + εij] + yi(3−j)[γ0 + γ1zi] > 0. (9)
All the observed characteristics are generated from the standard normal distribution N(0,1)
independently. The unobserved characteristics (εi1,εi2) are drawn from a joint normal dis-
tribution with unit variance and correlation coeﬃcient ρ.
I generate 100 samples of size 1000 to assess the property of my proposed estimator. True
parameters are β0 = −1.0, β1 = 2.5, β2 = 1.5, γ0 = 1.0, γ1 = 1.5, and ρ = −0.5. When
multiple Nash equilibria (i.e. both Yi = 0 and Yi = 2 are equilibria.) exist, I assume that the
event Yi = 2 occurs randomly with probability 0.7. The results are shown in Table 1. All the
parameters can be estimated reasonably well. The estimator for the correlation of unobserved
characteristics (ρ) has the largest mean squared error. In addition, this value is identiﬁed
only through the functional form assumption, not directly from the data. Therefore, in my
empirical study, I will have more conﬁdence on the estimator of the coeﬃcients β and γ, and
not make any inference about the estimated correlation ρ.
163 Data
The data come form the 2003 Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in Taiwan. This
survey was conducted by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics in
early 2004. It adopts a stratiﬁed two-stage sampling method with counties and cities as
subpopulations. The universal sampling rate is 0.20%, which is 13,681 households. Because
young kids are unlikely to make their own decisions and they are unlikely to use telephones,
young kids are not counted as household members in my empirical work. I deﬁne young
kids as people who are less than 6 years old. The estimation results do not change much
for diﬀerent deﬁnition of young kids. Based on this age criterion, there are 3,489 households
with two members.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. The ﬁrst two columns are means and
standard deviations for the subsample with two household members. The ﬁnal two columns
are for the entire sample in the survey. The upper panel shows the household-level variables,
while the lower panel presents individual-level variables. I construct three household-level
variables (age diﬀerence, education diﬀerence, and income diﬀerence) from the original data
by computing the diﬀerence of individual-level variables in each two-member household. In-
comes are measured in Taiwan dollars (TWD). The average exchange rate between US dollars
and Taiwan dollars in 2003 is 1 USD = 34.42 TWD. Note that household income is more than
twice of individual income in the subsample because part of the household income cannot be
attributed to either member. The mean of age in the subsample is considerably older than
that in the entire population. This is reasonable because families with one or more teenagers
living together with their parents are excluded in the subsample. Households in the subsam-
ple also tends to have lower total income because their sizes are smaller on average. Besides,
households in the subsample are modestly more likely to live in the South region.8
I only observe the total numbers of cellular phones in a household. Table 3 summarizes
8As deﬁned by the Directorate General of Telecommunications, the counties and cities included in each
of the three regions are the following. (1) North: Keelung, Taipei, Taoyuan, Hsinchu, Yilan, Hualien, and
Lienchiang; (2) Central: Miaoli, Taichung, Changhua, Nantou, and Yunlin; (3) South: Chiayi , Tainan,
Kaohsiung, Pingtung, Taitung, Penghu, and Kinmen.
17Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Subsample Entire Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Description
Household-level Variables
Cellular Phone 1.071 0.876 1.859 1.324 Number of cell phones
Household Income 0.789 0.603 1.065 0.740 Annual income (106 TWD)
City 0.793 0.405 0.807 0.395 Living in a city
Town 0.168 0.374 0.163 0.369 Living in a town
Rural 0.039 0.193 0.030 0.171 Living in rural area
North 0.444 0.497 0.472 0.499 Living in North region
Central 0.223 0.416 0.228 0.419 Living in Cental region
South 0.333 0.471 0.300 0.458 Living in South region
Number of Kids 0.270 0.597 0.217 0.530 Number of young kids
Household Size 2.000 0.000 3.310 1.490 Number of HH members
Age Diﬀerence 0.107 0.122 Age diﬀerence
Education Diﬀer. 0.305 0.330 Education diﬀerence (10 yr)
Income Diﬀerence 0.502 0.483 Individual income diﬀerence
Individual-level Variables
Gender 0.511 0.500 0.501 0.500 Female = 1
Age 0.523 0.185 0.387 0.202 Age (100 years)
Education 0.884 0.478 0.963 0.424 Years of Education (10 years)
Employment 0.478 0.500 0.466 0.499 Employed = 1
Individual Income 0.368 0.463 0.301 0.449 Annual Income (106 TWD)
sample size 3489 13681
Notes: The sampling weights are used to compute means and standard deviations.
Table 3: Distribution of the Number of Telephones in a Household
Number of
Cellular Phone Percentage
0 30.57
1 35.32
2 31.32
3 2.02
4 0.73
5 0.05
Notes: Percentages are computed
according to the sampling weights.
18the distributions of the number of telephones among households with two members. When
the total is zero, obviously neither member subscribes to the phone service. When it is one,
only one member in the household choose to subscribe, and the other member does not.
When there is more than one phone, I assume that both individuals choose to have one. In
my data, 3% of two-member households own more than two cellular phones.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, I apply the estimation method introduced in Section 2 to analyze the demand
for cellular phone service in Taiwan. The parameter estimates for the coeﬃcients in (1) are
presented in Table 4.
First, in Column (A), intra-household eﬀects are restricted to be zero. The model is
identical to the standard probit model except that unobserved characteristics εij are allowed
to be correlated within a household. The estimated coeﬃcients for household income and
individual income are both signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting cellular phone service is a normal
good. Moreover, age has a negative eﬀect on demand while education and employment have
positive eﬀects.
In Column (B), I include intra-household eﬀect in the choice model but assume the eﬀect
to be a constant γ0 across households. The marginal intra-household eﬀect is 28.4 percentage
points, which is signiﬁcantly positive. Therefore, I can reject the hypothesis γ0 = 0.9 This
result suggests the subscription decisions are strategically complements within a household.
There exists within-household networks eﬀect on the consumption of cellular phone service.
The estimate for the coeﬃcient of household income remains positive, but its magnitude is
much smaller than that in Column (A) once I control for the intra-household eﬀect.
In the ﬁnal two columns of Table 4, I allow for the heterogeneity of intra-household ef-
fect. The eﬀect is captured by z′
iγ. In Column (C), I include all observed household-level
characteristics into the vector zi. In addition to the household-level variables shown in Table
9Alternatively, the hypothesis can also be rejected by a likelihood-ratio test. The likelihood in Column (B)
is signiﬁcantly larger than the likelihood in Column (A).
19Table 4: Estimation Results
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Characteristics β β γ β γ β γ
constant 0.240 -0.485∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ 1.140∗∗∗ -0.465∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.112) (0.056) (0.151) (0.200) (0.124) (0.179)
[0.289]
Household Income 0.304∗∗∗ 0.087∗ -0.546∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.047) (0.134) (0.114) (0.119) (0.124)
[0.077] [0.025] [-0.156] [0.163] [-0.156] [0.173]
Town -0.129∗∗∗ -0.077∗ -0.007 -0.135 -0.139∗
(0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.089) (0.076)
[-0.033] [-0.022] [-0.002] [-0.038] [-0.039]
Rural -0.139 0.076 0.069 0.047 0.104
(0.103) (0.081) (0.105) (0.156) (0.126)
[-0.035] [0.022] [0.020] [0.013] [0.028]
Central -0.003 0.078 0.099 -0.050 0.058
(0.045) (0.056) (0.068) (0.073) (0.055)
[-0.001] [0.023] [0.029] [-0.014] [0.017]
South -0.083∗ -0.018 -0.022 0.002 -0.019
(0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.064) (0.043)
[-0.021] [-0.005] [-0.006] [0.001] [-0.006]
Number of Kids -0.029 -0.021 0.047 -0.173∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.032) (0.057) (0.062) (0.041)
[-0.007] [-0.006] [0.013] [-0.048] [-0.034]
Average Age -0.428 -0.472∗
(0.267) (0.257)
[-0.118] [-0.130]
Average Education 0.044
(0.097)
[0.012]
Average Employment -0.128 -0.188∗∗
(0.101) (0.092)
[-0.035] [-0.052]
Age Diﬀerence -1.013∗∗∗ -1.054∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.288)
[-0.280] [-0.290]
Education Diﬀerence 0.081 0.112
(0.075) (0.069)
[0.022] [0.031]
Income Diﬀerence 0.036
(0.150)
[0.010]
Gender 0.007 -0.124∗ -0.120∗ -0.128∗
(0.081) (0.064) (0.068) (0.067)
[0.002] [-0.036] [-0.035] [-0.037]
Age -2.677∗∗∗ -1.588∗∗∗ -1.364∗∗∗ -1.312∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.148) (0.153) (0.126)
[-0.677] [-0.461] [-0.391] [-0.378]
Education 0.742∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.084) (0.090) (0.082)
[0.188] [0.174] [0.157] [0.173]
Employment 0.419∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.063) (0.068) (0.060)
[0.114] [0.086] [0.073] [0.085]
Individual Income 0.617∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.161) (0.223) (0.178)
[0.156] [0.179] [0.325] [0.311]
ρ 0.014 -0.841∗∗∗ -0.908∗∗∗ -0.899∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.030) (0.019) (0.021)
Likelihood -2548.813 -2520.171 -2483.426 -2488.481
Notes: Standard errors, computed from 50 bootstrap draws, are in parentheses. Marginal eﬀects, computed as
average derivatives of the subscription probability except for for dummy variables whose eﬀects are evaluated
for a move from 0 to 1, are in square brackets. Superscripts
∗∗∗,
∗∗, and
∗represent signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively. The sample size is 3489 households.
202, I construct three additional household-level characteristics by averaging individual-level
variables within a household: average age, average education years, and average employment
status. The last speciﬁcation, Column (D), removes the characteristics which are not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in (C). According to likelihood-ratio tests, there are signiﬁcant
improvements in the likelihood from Column (B) to (C), but no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
(C) and (D) at the 5% signiﬁcance level. Consequently, I select Column (D) as the preferred
speciﬁcation.
The magnitude of intra-household eﬀect in a household can be expressed as the marginal
eﬀect of one member’s subscription decision on the other member. Speciﬁcally, the marginal
intra-household eﬀect is the change in the subscription probability for given observed char-
acteristics when the other member change his decision. For member j in household i, it can
be expressed as
Pr
 
[x′
ijβ + εij] + [z′
iγ] > 0|xij,zi
 
− Pr
 
[x′
ijβ + εij] > 0|xij,zi
 
.
Based on the parameters ˆ β and ˆ γ estimated in Column (D), I compute the marginal intra-
household eﬀect for each individual. Figure 3 shows the estimated distribution. All of
the estimated eﬀects are positive. On average, the eﬀect increases subscription by 35.24
percentage points, with a standard deviation of 10.50 percentage points. This is a substantial
eﬀect when comparing with the average subscription rate 51.77%. When one household
member chooses to subscribe, its average eﬀect on the other member is equivalent to the eﬀect
caused by increasing the other member’s own individual annual income by 2.283 million TWD
(equal to 66,326 USD) and holding the ﬁrst household member’s income ﬁxed. The existence
of positive intra-household eﬀects suggests the existence of network eﬀects of cellular phone
service within a household.
As Figure 3 illustrates, intra-household eﬀects vary a lot across households. Estimate
of the vector-valued parameter γ diﬀers signiﬁcantly from zero at 5% level for several vari-
ables, providing explanations for the heterogeneity. The impact of household income on
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Figure 3: Histogram of the estimated marginal intra-household eﬀects
intra-household eﬀects is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Increasing house-
hold income by one standard deviation (i.e. 603 thousand TWD) raises the marginal intra-
household eﬀect by 10.4 percentage points. This is probably because households with higher
income tend to work longer and spend less time together. Unfortunately, I do not have data
on working hours to verify this conjecture. Households in cities have larger marginal intra-
household eﬀect than those in towns by 3.9 percentage points. The number of kids has a
negative eﬀect, probably because families with more kids tend to spend more time together
and hence reduce the network eﬀect of cellular phone service. Each additional kid reduces the
marginal intra-household eﬀect by 3.4 percentage points. Interestingly, similar to the ﬁndings
in Browning et al. (1994), intra-household eﬀects are aﬀected by the diﬀerence of individual
characteristics within a household. Age diﬀerence reduces the intra-household eﬀect. For in-
stance, at the mean age diﬀerence (i.e. 10.7 years), marginal intra-household eﬀect is smaller
than a household with identical-age members by 3.0 percentage points. Within-household
network eﬀect of cellular phone consumption decreases in the relative age. On the contrary,
22Table 5: Cellular Phone Ownership by Region
North Central South
Cellular Phone per Household 2.0422 1.7941 1.6212
Cellular Phone per Person 0.5739 0.4892 0.4806
Table 6: Cellular Phone Ownership by Urbanization Level
City Town Rural Area
Cellular Phone per Household 1.9522 1.5314 1.1450
Cellular Phone per Person 0.5557 0.4198 0.3489
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence across the three regions: North, Central, and South. Income
diﬀerence within a household only has a small and insigniﬁcant eﬀect.
Contrary to most previous researches on telecommunication demand, I can estimate the
direct eﬀect (β) of both household-level and individual-level characteristics. Diﬀerent from
the ﬁndings in Column (A), where intra-household eﬀect is abstracted away, the demand
increases in individual income but decreases in household income when I account for the
intra-household eﬀects in Column (D). The magnitude of the former eﬀect (31.1%) is almost
twice the magnitude of the latter one (15.6%). Consequently, the overall eﬀect of raising a
consumer’s income is positive. For instance, raising a consumer’s income by one standard
deviation (i.e. 463 thousand TWD) increases his own demand by 7.16 percentage points.
Nonetheless, the ﬁnding is in contrast with several previous studies on the demand for landline
phone service.10
As for the geographic variables, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the direct eﬀect across
regions and across urbanization levels. Table 5 and Table 6 show the penetration rate of
cellular service across regions and across urbanization levels. Although the penetration rates
are higher in the North region and in cities, the demand for cellular phone service does
10For example, Miravete (2002) ﬁnds household income has negative eﬀects on landline phone service in two
cities in Kentucky in 1986. Economides et al. (2006) also ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of income on the demand in
New York State in the period 1999 – 2003.
23not have a systematic relationship with the penetration rates. Consequently, there is no
evidence showing the existence of network eﬀects resulting from geographic neighborhoods.
Furthermore, while there are four cellular phone carriers operating in the North region, there
are ﬁve carriers operating in the Central and the South regions. More carriers in the Central
and South regions provide more varieties to consumers. However, varieties of cellular phone
service do not have signiﬁcant eﬀect on the demand.11
Lastly, the direct eﬀects on demand resulting from individual characteristics are consistent
with intuition. The demand is stronger for young, better-educated, and employed people.
Females have weaker demand than males though the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant only at the 10%
level. The estimation result is probably caused by the fact that young and better-educated
people are more familiar with new technology. Employed people usually spend more time
away from home, so they are likely to have higher demand.
5 Conclusion
I empirically analyze intra-household eﬀects on the demand for cellular phone service under
a game-theoretical framework. Because of the interaction between household members, it
is possible to have multiple Nash equilibria in a non-cooperative simultaneous-move game.
Nonetheless, the model parameters are fully identiﬁed from the household-level data. I use
a semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator to analyze the demand for cellular phone
service in Taiwan. The intra-household eﬀect of cellular phone service is positive on average,
supporting the existence of network eﬀect on cellular phone consumption within a household.
I also analyze how the intra-household eﬀect varies with household characteristics. This eﬀect
increases in household income but decreases in the number of kids and the age diﬀerence in a
household. Furthermore, my estimator provide an estimation of the direct eﬀect on telephone
service consumption resulting from observed characteristics, after accounting for the intra-
household eﬀects.
11It is possible that the eﬀects caused by higher penetration rates and fewer varieties in the North region
cancel out. Without more information, I cannot distinguish between these two eﬀects.
24In the current paper, I restrict my attention to household with only two members. An
important extension is to include households with more than two individuals. Contrary to
the two-member case, the exact probability of any observed event is unknown due to multiple
equilibria. The parameters are only partially identiﬁed by inequality conditions.
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